The battle of October victory... The Road to Peace
The Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, Major General Dr Taha Al-Magdoub, wrote:
The victory of the Egyptian will power in the October 1973 war was the main factor to a possible Arab-Israeli peace.
Before peace, the victorious and the defeated party formed an imbalanced equation of power that could not render balanced peace. Hence, the option for war was indispensable to the Egyptians and Arabs.
There was no other alternative to fix this equation and bring the supercilious foe back on the grounds of reality which entails peace built on justice, logic and the respect of the rights of all parties, rather than peace based on the rights of the arrogant force, occupation of lands and indifference to the rights of others.
The following article by strategist Dr Taha Al-Magdoub elaborates on this issue based on his book: "The War of October... The Road to a Comprehensive Settlement".
Over more than two decades of the revolution era and the contemporary history of Egypt, specifically from 1952 to 1973, Egypt underwent three unique war experiences taking the form of fierce battles.
These battles waged in 1956, 1967, and 1973 had various dimensions and repercussions. They forced the four-year revolution to go into armed struggle and international conflicts.
But the revolution managed to overcome these crises in a bid to achieve freedom, independence, security and peace, for the sake of the unity and stability of the Arab nation.
In 1956, Egypt was stormed by a major conspiracy schemed by two major powers, namely Britain and France, as well as Israel.
The latter seized the opportunity to wage a ferocious aggressive war against Egypt under the pretext that Egypt exercised its legitimate right, declaring the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The nationalization was launched by Egypt in order to build herself and erect her High Dam in Aswan in a bid to realise growth and prosperity.
The three belligerent States wanted to reach one agreed-upon end; to oust the new regime in Egypt, to impede the wheel of progress and deprive the Egyptian people of the right to development and life.
Egypt succeeded to overcome that experience, defying the aggressors, and her foes were incapable of realizing their target. They, consequently, had to make Egypt undergo a bigger and harsher experience, storming another two Arab States; Jordan and Syria.
Their end that time had been more decisive and ambitious. They did not strike Egypt alone, but the whole Arab nation, represented in the three States, giving the greenlight to Israel for the establishment of the Greater Hebrew State. In 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with the support of a superpower, the US, under a similar pretext as claimed in the previous experience.
The third experience had been different in comparison with the two earlier experiences. Egypt had to restore the occupied lands after the assimilation of the bitter experience, believing, on one hand, that her land cannot be restored and peace gained while in the position of defeat. On the other hand, the military action, amid the contemporary world developments, cannot play as the sole factor in the settlement of any struggle.
Egypt had a conviction that a host of approaches can lead to full success, provided that they are backed by the will, high morale, and insistence on reaching the end in the course of the so-called "comprehensive strategy," that applies various tools executed over a long term..
The Egyptian experience achieved resounding success. Egypt won and had a say, brushing aside the stigma of defeat and making one of the most glorious military achievements in October 1973. Egypt vanquished the myth that Israel is undefeatable, cutting her long arm policy and infiltrating her safe lines.
Egypt opted for genuine peace to crown the Egyptian victory when Late President Anwar Sadat stood under the dome of the People's Assembly on October 16, 1973, calling for a ceasefire and the convocation of a conference on peace to probe all-out settlement. The late President said global change entail defusing disputes and opting for peace as a common end of humanity. Peace cannot be reached through good offices only, but through a solid political will adherent to and insistent on the goal.
The essence of struggle, whatever its level is, is the struggle of will power based on objective and rational considerations. The willpower for achieving settlement should be available in the parties of a struggle through showing readiness to resolve contradictions and accept compromises. In the meantime, they should search for mutual interests and common values to give further momentum to the peace march. The Arab-Israeli struggle entered the orbit of peace 25 years ago, in the wake of the October victory.
After the June 1967 war the Security Council issued resolution number242 in November 1967, considered as an axis to the peace process until now. The resolution stipulates the non-legitimacy of capturing lands by force and admitted that the parties to the struggle are entitled to exist within safe borders. It also stipulates the withdrawal from the lands occupied by Israel in 1967.
Neverthless, the parties to the struggle have never reached an acceptable solution due to the lack of power and the incapability of the approaches used by the international community to impose its will on the parties involved. The Egyptian choice for peace highlighted a deep vision for the future and crystalized a new strategy, featuring high both comprehensiveness and flexibility, whether on the level of setting the goals or selecting the tools of movement.
The October victory set the primary will for movement which was the first organised effort, standing on the scientific method in the management of conflicts, in a bid to forge it ahead to the circle of peaceful settlement and launch not only normalisation, but the cooperation of neighbouring countries. The Arab-Israeli struggle due to the victory of October entertained understandings that stemmed from a clear Egyptian point of view different in core and crux from the stagnant methods that had driven the Arab causes to the caves of negligence.
The US, on its part, out of keenness on the security of Israel and conviction that the Israeli dream vanished by the new Arab facts, exerted strenuous efforts to open an immediate dialogue with Egypt through the tours of the then Secretary of State Henry kissinger. The dialogue kicked off with the six-item agreement in November 1973. The first disengagement of forces agreement then followed in January 1974. Finally, the second disengagement of forces agreement was concluded with Egypt in September 1975, leading to the Egyptian peace initiative in 1977 when late President Sadat visited Jerusalem.
The visit represented a climax in the peace march leading to all-out settlement.
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